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Abstract  
 
This paper investigates wage dynamics assuming the potential presence of dual wage 
stickiness: with respect to both the frequency as well as the size of wage adjustments. In 
particular, this paper proposes a structural model of wage inflation dynamics assuming 
that although workers adjust wage contracts at discrete time intervals, they are limited in 
their abilities to adjust wages as much as they might desire. The dual wage stickiness 
model nests the baseline model, based on Calvo-type wage stickiness, as a particular case. 
Empirical results favor the dual sticky wage model over the baseline model that assumes 
only one type of wage stickiness in several dimensions. In particular, it outperforms the 
baseline model in terms of goodness of fitness as well as in the ability to explain the 
observed reverse dynamic cross-correlation between wage inflation and real output - 
which the baseline model fails to capture. 
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1. Introduction 
        
            Wage dynamics have important implications for households, firms, and for 
monetary and fiscal policies. The goal of this paper is to construct a sticky wage model 
that is able to provide not only an improved characterization of wage dynamics for policy 
analysis, but also to replicate the reverse dynamic correlation between wage inflation and 
real output. 1  In particular, this paper proposes a novel framework that successfully 
combines two types of wage stickiness.  
            Staggered wage contract models based on Calvo (1983) have been widely 
employed in the literature (e.g., Kollmann 1996; Erceg, Henderson and Levin 2000; 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007; Justiniano and 
Primiceri 2008; among several others). These models assume that a fraction of workers 
completely adjust their wages at discrete time intervals in response to changes in the 
economic environment.  However, the assumption that workers are able to adjust their 
wages as much as they would like to when they periodically negotiate their wage 
contracts is not realistic. Since wages are determined through the interaction between 
workers and firms, the workers' ability to fully adjust their wages is likely to be limited. 
As a consequence, although workers may re-optimize their wages at certain time intervals, 
wages can be partially adjusted in response to changes in economic conditions. 
            In this respect, this paper investigates the existence of dual types of wage 
stickiness: one with respect to the frequency of wage adjustments and another with 
                                                 
1 The dynamic correlation that has been observed between wage inflation and real output indicates that 
current output is negatively related to past wage inflation, while also being positively correlated to future 
wage inflation. Taylor (1999) stresses that the ability to explain the reverse dynamic correlation between 
price inflation and real output is an important “measure of success” of monetary models. Similarly, the 
ability to explain the reverse dynamic correlation between wage inflation and real output could be 
considered to be a success of a sticky wage model. 
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respect to the magnitude of those adjustments. More specifically, the proposed model 
introduces, in addition to Calvo-type wage stickiness, the quadratic costs of wage 
adjustment that make it costly for current wages to deviate from previous period wages. 
In this way, workers' limited abilities to fully adjust wages are formally taken into 
consideration. Although both the Calvo-type wage setting and the quadratic costs of wage 
adjustment play a similar role in generating wage stickiness, their implications are 
different with respect to the frequency and size of wage adjustments. That is, while 
Calvo-type wage stickiness is related to the timing/frequency of wage adjustment, the 
quadratic costs of wage adjustment are associated with the magnitude of wage changes 
when workers reset their wage contracts. In the proposed dual wage stickiness model, 
current wage inflation depends on past and expected future wage inflation, current and 
expected future price inflation, and wage markup.2 The lagged wage inflation term is 
introduced into the model due to these two sources of wage stickiness. The proposed 
model extends the baseline sticky wage model by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (EHL 
baseline, 2000) to include our proposed feature, dual wage stickiness.3
            In order to investigate the presence of dual wage stickiness and wage inflation 
dynamics, this paper builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that 
allows workers and firms to optimally set their wage contracts and prices, respectively, in 
monopolistically competitive labor and goods markets. The central bank conducts 
monetary policy using the Taylor rule. 
                                                 
2 Wage markup is defined as the difference between the real wage rate and the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure. 
3 While the Calvo-cum-wage-indexation model by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) assumes that 
wages change continuously, the proposed model assumes that wages are adjusted infrequently. The Calvo-
cum-wage-indexation model allows each worker to adjust their wages optimally or by automatic indexation 
in any given period. 
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            The DSGE model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. The findings favor the 
dual wage stickiness model over the baseline model based on only Calvo-type wage 
stickiness. First, although households reset their wages at certain intervals of time, 
estimates of the parameter associated with the quadratic costs of wage adjustment are 
significantly different from zero, rejecting the null hypothesis of no quadratic wage 
adjustment costs. Second, the marginal likelihood clearly supports the dual wage 
stickiness model over the baseline model, which relies only on Calvo-type wage 
stickiness (Calvo 1983). The inclusion of quadratic wage adjustment costs yields a 
substantial improvement of the model in fitting the data. Third, the observed dynamic 
correlation between wage inflation and real output can be better replicated under dual 
wage stickiness. While the baseline model fails to generate the expected lead-lag 
relationship between wage inflation and output, the introduction of quadratic costs of 
wage adjustment in the proposed model yields the observed negative (positive) 
relationship between past (future) wage inflation and real output. The dual wage 
stickiness model is able to explain the fact that a rise in current output is associated with a 
subsequent increase in wage inflation. Overall, the presence of dual sticky wage 
stickiness helps provide an improved explanation of wage inflation dynamics. 
            In order to check the stability of the structural parameters, the DSGE model is 
estimated using two subsamples. The full sample, from 1960:1 to 2007:4, is divided 
before and after 1980. The findings demonstrate that while most of the structural 
parameters are stable over subsamples, there are substantial changes in monetary policy 
along the lines of the ones found in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). In particular, the 
response of the Federal Reserve to inflation is different across subsamples.  
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            The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The sticky wage model is derived in 
the next section assuming the two types of wage stickiness. Section 3 presents the 
empirical results from estimation of the proposed DSGE model using Bayesian 
techniques. Evidence on dual wage stickiness is provided in terms of the marginal 
likelihood and the dynamic cross-correlation between wage inflation and output. In 
addition, this section investigates robustness of the estimation results to sub-samples. The 
last section concludes this paper. 
 
2 A Model Economy 
 
 
2.1 Households 
 
 
            There is a continuum of households indexed by ].1  ,0[∈i Following EHL (2000), 
this paper assumes that each household is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor 
service. A representative labor aggregator combines households' differentiated labor 
services into units of labor for use in the production sector. While each household has 
monopoly power over a differentiated labor service, the labor aggregator faces perfect 
competition, making zero profits.4 Each household chooses the amount of consumption, 
the amount of contingent claims and set his/her wage. The intertemporal utility function 
of household i  is given by 
                                             .
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Household i  maximizes the expected utility function subject to the budget constraint, 
                                                 
4 As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), this paper does not assume capital. See EHL for details. 
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where  and tittititi WPBHC ,,,,   ,  , ,  , ti,Π  denotes real consumption, hours worked, state-
contingent claims, the price index, wages, and a share of profits, respectively.  is the 
price of state contingent claims that pays one dollar if a particular state of nature is 
realized in period . Each household owns an equal share of all firms and receives 
equal profit ( ) from firms. The indicator function  is equal to 1 when household i  
resets its wage contract and otherwise is equal to zero. The indicator function is 
introduced because of the assumption that each household keeps its wage contract 
unchanged with a constant probability 
1, +ttJ
1+t
ti,Π tiI ,
wα  in any given period. It is worth emphasizing 
that households face the quadratic costs of adjusting wages only when they reset their 
wage contracts. In the Calvo economy, a constant fraction ( wα−1 ) of households that 
receive a random wage-change signal are allowed to reoptimize their wage contracts 
every period, whereas the remaining households keep their wages unchanged in any 
given period.5 The quadratic costs of wage adjustment appear in the budget constraint to 
restrict each household's ability to fully adjust its wages in response to changes in 
economic environment. The costs of wage adjustment increase with the magnitude of the 
adjustment, resulting in sticky wages.  
In the literature, wage rigidities are typically introduced through either a Calvo-
type staggered wage setting (e.g., EHL 2000) or the quadratic wage adjustment costs (e.g., 
Kim 2000). Since these modeling approaches play the same role in making wages sticky, 
                                                 
5 The timing/frequency of wage changes is exogenously determined in the Calvo economy. The time 
interval between wage changes is given by )1/(1 wα−  on average. 
 
 5
within the literature either one or the other is considered to be a potential source of wage 
stickiness. However, despite the similarity between the two approaches in terms of wage 
stickiness, they reflect different dimensions of the decision problems that households face. 
Households are likely to face two problems regarding wage setting in the micro level: (1) 
when to change wages, (2) how much to change wages. The second problem is especially 
critical when households' abilities to fully adjust their wages are limited. Analogous to 
the idea the firms have limited abilities to fully adjust prices due to the interaction 
between consumers and firms in the goods market, which is formally introduced through 
the use of quadratic adjustment costs (e.g., Rotemberg 1982), households' limited abilities 
that arise as a result of the interaction between firms and households in the labor market 
could be modeled using the quadratic costs of adjusting wages. While the first problem of 
households is related to Calvo-type staggered wage setting, the second problem is 
associated with the quadratic wage adjustment costs.          
Following EHL (2000), this paper assumes that a set of complete state-contingent 
claims are available to households, which ensures that these agents are homogeneous 
with respect to holdings of contingent claims and consumption. Since such claims are 
able to provide complete insurance from the idiosyncratic income risk that arises from 
staggered wage contracts and the wage adjustment cost, households make identical 
decisions with respect to consumption and holdings of contingent claims. 
            The maximization of the objective function with respect to consumption and 
holdings of contingent claims subject to the budget constraint leads to the Euler equation. 
Log-linearizing the Euler equation gives rise to the familiar IS curve that can be written 
as 
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where  denotes output. The nominal interest rate  is defined as the log-deviation of 
 from the steady state. The parameter 
ty tr
1
1, ][
−
+ttJ σ  measures the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. 
 
2.2 Households and Wage Setting 
 
 
            Household i  supplies a differentiated labor service  to the labor aggregator, 
which combines a continuum of individual types of labor supplied into an aggregate labor 
service, , using a CES aggregator function described by 
tiH ,
tH
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where the parameter 1≥wθ  is the elasticity of substitution across differentiated labor 
services. The labor aggregator purchases individual types of labor at a given wage  
for labor type i  and sells each unit of labor to the production sector at the aggregate wage 
rate . The perfectly competitive labor aggregator chooses  to maximize its profit, 
taking each household's wage as given. The aggregator's objective function is described 
by 
tiW ,
tW tiH ,
                                                                         (5)                        .
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The first order condition associated with this problem leads to the demand for labor 
supplied by household i  
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Integrating (6) results in the following equation 
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interpreted as the aggregate wage index. 
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Household i  chooses its nominal wage by maximizing the objective function (1) 
subject to both the budget constraint and the labor demand function (6), assuming that the 
newly optimized wage remains in effect with the probability wα  in any given period. 
Solving household i 's problem with respect to  is equivalent to maximizing the 
objective function: 
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subject to the labor demand curve (6), delivering the same first order condition. kt+Γ  
represents the marginal utility of income at time kt + . The objective function (8) clearly 
shows each household's problem with respect to a wage  for labor type i . tiW ,
The first order condition associated with the object function (8) leads to the same 
optimal wage choice for all households that adjust their wages at time t .6 Following 
Calvo's scheme, the aggregate wage level evolves according to 
                               [ )1/(11 11 ]~)1( www twtwt WWW θθθ αα −−−− +−=                                   (9) 
where tW
~  is the optimal wage chosen by households at time . Log-linearizing the first 
order condition from (8) yields the following equation given by 
t
                                                 
6 see Woodford (2003) for details. 
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The lower-case variables represent the log-deviations of variables of interest from steady 
state values.  denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
hours worked.  is defined as 
tmrs
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The log-linearization of equation (9) yields )1/()(~ 1 wtwtt www αα −−= − , therefore 
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1
~~
−− tt ww  into equation (10), a lagged wage inflation term  is endogenously 
introduced into the model. Since dual wage stickiness makes wages sticky twice, current 
wages can be expressed as a function of , which is necessary to generate a lagged 
wage inflation term. The wage Phillips curve can be written as follows: 
w
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),1)(1(2 wwc αβατ −−≡  and ./)1)(1)(1(w ξβααθλ www −−−≡  The wage mark-up ( ) as 
a driving force of wage inflation is defined as the difference between the real wage and 
the marginal rate of substitution, that is,  When the quadratic 
adjustment cost does not exist, the proposed model collapses into the baseline model 
reported in the literature, 
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Since the proposed dual wage stickiness model nests equation (12) as a special case, the 
significant estimate of c  can be interpreted as a test for the presence of the quadratic 
costs of adjustment. 
The following identity relationship between real wages and wage inflation is 
considered: 
                                           .11 tttttt pwpwpw Δ−Δ+−≡− −−                                      (13) 
In the next subsection, the new Keynesian Phillips curve is derived for DSGE model 
analysis. 
 
2.3 Firms and Price Setting 
 
 
This paper assumes that the economy consists of two types of firms, the 
representative final-goods-producing firm and a continuum of intermediate-goods-
producing firms. The final-goods-producing firm purchases intermediate goods and 
transforms a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by ]1 ,0[∈j , into the final good 
using a constant returns to scale production function of the Dixit-Stiglitz form: 
                                                                                           (14) 
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where 1≥pθ  is the constant elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. The 
final good, , is produced by combining intermediate goods from the perfectly 
competitive, representative firm, which maximizes its profit taking the prices of 
intermediate goods ( ) as given. Maximizing profit with respect to  
yields the demand curve that an intermediate-goods-producing firm
tY
]1 ,0[ ,, ∈jP tj tjY ,
j  faces 
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Integrating (15) reveals the relationship between the price of the final good and the prices 
of intermediate goods, which can be written as             
                                                                                      (16) .
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The price of the final good is viewed as the aggregate price index. It is assumed that a 
constant fraction )1( pα−  of firms can reset their prices with all other firms keeping their 
prices unchanged in any given period. Since the intermediate-goods-producing firms 
choose the same price, tjt PP ,
~ =  for all j  in equilibrium, the aggregate price level evolves 
according to 
                                [ ] .~)1( )1/(11 11 ppp tptpt PPP θθθ αα −−−− +−=                                   (17) 
The Calvo pricing equation implies that the aggregate price level is a function of its own 
lag, which can potentially cause aggregate prices to change in a sluggish manner. 
The model assumes an economy with firms producing intermediate goods 
according to constant returns to scale,   represents the neutral technology 
shock, which is identical across firms. The integration of the production function with 
respect to 
.,, tjttj HAY = tA
j  leads to  The log-linearization of .ttt HAY = ttt HAY =  yields 
                                               ttt hay +=                                                           (18) 
where  and  are the log-deviations of  and  from steady state values, 
respectively.  follows an AR(1) process, , where  is distributed 
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) ,0( aN σ . 
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The monopolistically competitive intermediate-goods-producing firm j  chooses 
tP
~  to maximize the following objective function, 
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subject to the demand curve for the intermediate good j , equation (15).7  denotes 
the marginal cost at time . Combining equation (17) and the first order condition of 
equation (19) yields the new Keynesian Phillips curve: 
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where  is defined as the distance between the real wage and the marginal product of 
labor, . 
tmc
ttt mplpw −− )(
 
2.4 Monetary Policy and the Taylor Rule 
 
 
The central bank conducts monetary policy using the Taylor rule to set short-term 
interest rates in response to inflation and output. 
                                                              (21) 
The parameter 
))(1( 11 ty
p
tttt yErr απαρρ π +−+= +−
ρ  measures the degree of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy. To 
stabilize the economy, the central bank adjusts nominal interest rates gradually in 
response to changes in the expected inflation and output. The central bank's response to 
inflation and output is determined by the magnitude of πα  and yα , respectively. 
 
                                                 
7 Firms can face costs of adjusting wages. However, those costs of adjusting wages are not related to the 
newly optimized price. So, we ignore it in the above objective function.  
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3 Empirical Results: Bayesian Estimation 
 
3.1 The Data 
 
 
The data used are quarterly U.S. series for interest rate, price inflation, real wages, 
hours worked, and real GDP. The sample period ranges from 1960:1 to 2007:04. 
Aggregate price is measured by the GDP deflator. Hours worked and nominal wages 
(nominal compensation per hour) are from the non-farm business sector. Real wages are 
obtained by dividing nominal compensation per hour by the GDP deflator. The effective 
federal fund rate is used to represent interest rates. The real wage and hours worked are 
detrended using the HP-filter. Output is detrended by the use of the Congressional Budget 
Office's potential output. Price inflation is defined as the quarterly log difference in the 
GDP deflator. Wage inflation is similarly defined as the log difference in nominal wages. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
 
Following Ireland (2004), in order to consider the potential misspecification in the 
IS and Phillips curves related to the presence of lags of price inflation and output, I 
replace equation (3) and (20), respectively, with: 
                                   )()1( 111 +−+ −−−+= ttttttt EryyEy πσϕϕ                                    (22) 
                          .
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p
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αβαπγπγβπ −−+−+= −+                       (23) 
These equations nest equation (3) and (20) as a special case when ϕ  and γ , 
respectively.8 The estimates of ϕ  and γ  determine the relative importance of the lagged 
terms in explaining output and inflation dynamics.9  
                                                 
8 This paper also estimates the DSGE model with ϕ  (orγ ) fixed to be 1. See Table 3.   
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For empirical analysis, we add exogenous shocks to (11), (21), (22) and (23). 
Each exogenous shock can be written as follows: 
                                                                                                              (24) kt
k
tk
k
t νεδε += −1
where each innovation ktν  is normally distributed ) ,0( kN σ for .,,, pyrwk =  We assume 
that .0== wr δδ 10 The shocks are interpreted as the wage-push, interest rate, demand, 
and cost-push shocks, respectively. All of these shocks, including the technology shock, 
are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. 
 
3.3 Estimation Results 
 
 
The DSGE model parameters are collected in the parameter vector, 
. }  ,  ,  , , , , , , , , , , ,c , , ,{ y awiyayp σσσσσδδδααργϕσβα πππ=Φ  The parameter wθ  is 
set equal to 6. Due to an identification problem, the parameter wα  is set at 0.75, which is 
equivalent to assuming that households negotiate their wages every 4 quarters. After 
surveying both direct and indirect evidence in the literature, Taylor (1999) reports that the 
average frequency of wage changes is about one year. It is worth emphasizing that in the 
literature, in contrast to price rigidities, wages rigidities -- with respect to the frequency 
of wage changes -- are not controversial. In this respect, we focus on the empirical 
relevance of quadratic costs of wage adjustment in this section.11 A Bayesian approach is 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 A rationale for the lagged output term in the IS curve can be found, for example, in habit in consumption 
(Furher 2000), which significantly improves the model's fit to the data (e.g., Smets and Wouters 2007). A 
lagged price inflation term can be introduced into the Phillips curve by assuming that a fraction of firms 
index their prices to past inflation, as in Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano et al (2005). Rabanal and 
Rubio-Ramirez (2005) use Bayesian techniques to show that the introduction of price indexation 
significantly improves the model's fit to the data. 
10 Although not reported here, the estimation results indicate that the estimates of rδ  and wδ  are not 
significantly different from zero. 
11 The contribution of Calvo-type wage stickiness to the marginal likelihood is investigated in section 3.4. 
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adopted to estimate the model parameters. The posterior distribution for the estimated 
coefficients is obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.  
                              Table 1: Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Model  
Prior  Prior Prior Parameters distribution mean 
Note: Table 1 shows Bayesian estimation results for DSGE model. The parameter, wα , is assumed to be 
0.75, which implies that the average duration of fixed wages is 4 quarters. The number of draws is 50,000. 
This paper keeps 25,000 draws. The Metropolis-hastings algorithm is used to obtain the posterior 
distribution. Estimates cover the sample period 1960Q1 to 2007Q4. Log-likelihood is -466.6. 
St. dev. 
Posterior 
mean 
95%  of 
confidence interval 
pα  beta 0.66 0.05 0.83 [ 0.80 , 0.86 ] 
β  normal 0.99 0.01 0.99 [ 0.97 , 1.00 ] 
σ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.06 [ 0.05 , 0.08 ] 
c  normal 0.00 25.0 117.2 [ 91.6, 142.5 ] 
ϕ  beta 0.50 0.10 0.66 [ 0.60 , 0.72 ] 
γ  beta 0.50 0.10 0.34 [ 0.26 , 0.42 ] 
ρ  beta 0.70 0.05 0.77 [ 0.74 , 0.80 ] 
πα  normal 1.50 0.15 1.70 [ 1.57 , 1.83 ] 
yα  normal 0.50 0.10 0.52 [ 0.38 , 0.65 ] 
πδ  beta 0.50 0.10 0.05 [ 0.01 , 0.09 ] 
yδ  beta 0.50 0.10 0.87 [ 0.83 , 0.92 ] 
αδ  beta 0.50 0.10 0.88 [ 0.84 , 0.93 ] 
πσ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.21 [ 0.19 , 0.24 ] 
yσ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.04 [ 0.03 , 0.04 ] 
iσ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.31 [ 0.28 , 0.33 ] 
wσ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.44 [ 0.40 , 0.48 ] 
aσ  invg 0.10 2.00 0.58 [ 0.53 , 0.62 ] 
 
Table 1 reports the prior and posterior distribution of each coefficient. The Calvo 
parameter for staggered price setting is estimated to be around 0.83, which implies that 
the average contract duration is about 5.9 quarters. The estimated mean of this parameter 
is in line with the one obtained in Gali and Gertler (1999). However, the estimated 
duration of fixed prices is much higher than the values reported in micro studies such as 
Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). In particular, Nakamura 
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and Steinsson (2008) reports that the average frequency of price changes is about 3 
quarters. The posterior mean estimate of β  is consistent with the conventional estimate 
from the literature. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ   is 0.06, which is lower 
than assumed in the prior distribution. Since the Calvo wage stickiness parameter wα  is 
set to be 0.75, a main point is to test the null hypothesis of 0=c , that is, to test the 
existence of any additional sources of wage stickiness associated with the size of wage 
adjustment. The prior for c  is set to be zero, which is consistent with the literature. In 
contrast with the literature, the estimate of c  is significantly different from its prior mean, 
supporting the proposed sticky wage model.12  
The coefficient on output expectations (ϕ ) is estimated to be 0.66, which implies 
that expectations play a relatively more important role than past output in determining 
current output. In contrast, the estimate of γ  (0.34) suggests that past inflation in the 
Phillips curve plays a crucial role in explaining inflation dynamics.13  
Turning next to the monetary policy parameters, the parameter measuring the 
degree of smoothing is estimated to be 0.77. There is a range of evidence regarding the 
substantial degree of interest rate smoothing in the literature (e.g., Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler 2000). The response of the Federal Reserve to inflation is estimated to be 1.70, 
ranging from 1.57 to 1.83. The parameter estimate associated with the Fed's response to 
output is 0.52. 
 
 
                                                 
12 These results are quite robust to a possible set of wage stickiness with respect to the frequency of wage 
changes. The estimate of c  corresponding to an integer value of the average duration of wage changes 
)1/(1 wα− , from 2 to 8 quarters is significantly different from its prior mean. 
13  In the next subsection, this paper further investigates the importance of these backward-looking 
components in terms of the value of marginal likelihood. 
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3.4 The Relative Importance of Each Friction of the Model 
 
 
In the literature, the most common way of characterizing staggered wage setting 
is to employ a variant of Calvo's (1983) mechanism as a source of wage stickiness with 
respect to the frequency of wage adjustment. Deviating from the existing literature, this 
paper introduces an additional source of wage rigidities through the quadratic costs of 
adjusting wages. The introduction of wage rigidities with respect to the size of wage 
adjustment, in addition to Calvo-type wage stickiness, raises the question of whether the 
friction is empirically relevant in explaining wage inflation dynamics. In response to this 
question, the contribution of the quadratic costs of wage adjustment to explaining the data 
is evaluated in terms of the marginal likelihood. This section also examines the 
contribution of other frictions to the marginal likelihood. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the mode of the model parameters and the 
marginal likelihood to evaluate the relative importance of each friction of the DSGE 
model, such as the backward-looking components in the IS and Phillips curves, price and 
wage stickiness, by examining the relevance of each friction one at a time. The marginal 
likelihood is computed using the Laplace approximation. 
For comparison, the second column of Table 2 reports the estimates of the mode of the 
parameters of the proposed DSGE model as a benchmark, which are quite similar to the 
posterior mean estimates from Table 1. The third column shows the estimates of the 
mode of the DSGE model parameters when the purely forward-looking IS curve is 
employed. These estimates are similar to those of the benchmark model. However, the 
marginal likelihood is lower than that of the benchmark model (which has a difference of 
about 11), indicating that the lagged output term improves the model fit. 
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Table 2: The Relative Importance of Each of the Frictions 
 
Parameters Benchmark 1=ϕ  1=γ  1=pα  1=c  0&
3/1
=
=
c
wα  
pα  0.83 0.84 0.88 - 0.77 0.88 
wα  - - - - 0.91 - 
β  0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98 
σ  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.66 0.14 0.73 
c  117.1 110.2 100.8 117.7 - - 
ϕ  0.66 - 0.72 0.65 0.51 0.07 
γ  0.35 0.33 - 0.14 0.55 0.26 
ρ  0.77 0.80 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.77 
πα  1.70 1.61 1.84 1.80 1.63 1.65 
yα  0.51 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.51 0.76 
πδ  0.03 0.03 0.93 0.87 0.31 0.01 
yδ  0.88 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.99 0.85 
αδ  0.88 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.90 
πσ  0.21 0.21 0.05 0.96 0.23 0.22 
yσ  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.35 
iσ  0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.31 
wσ  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.80 2.55 
aσ  0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 
Marginal  
likelihood -466.7 -477.8 -489.0 -585.7 -590.6 -688.5 
Note: This Table shows the estimates of the mode of the model parameters using Bayesian 
techniques. Note that pα =1/3 ( wα =1/3) implies that the average frequency of price (wage) 
changes is 1.5 quarters. The estimates cover the sample period 1960Q1 to 2007Q4. In the 6th 
column, the present paper adopts the same prior for pα  and wα . 
 
Regarding the model with the purely forward-looking Phillips curve reported in 
the fourth column, the marginal likelihood significantly falls from -466.7 to -489.0. The 
Bayes ratio is computed to be greater than , which, according to Jeffreys' rule 
(1961), implies that the lagged inflation term leads to a significant improvement in 
explaining inflation dynamics. This evidence is consistent with Rabanal and Rubio-
Ramirez (2005). It is worth noting that the estimate of the AR(1) coefficient (
101047.0 ×
πδ ) 
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significantly increases from 0.03 to 0.93 when the lagged inflation term is not included. 
This result suggests that when the purely forward-looking Phillips curve is adopted, the 
AR(1) process probably replaces the role of the lagged inflation term in describing the 
data. 
Reducing the average duration between price changes to 1.5 quarters (that is, 
3/1=pα ) gives rise to a drastic fall in the marginal likelihood. The findings indicate that 
price stickiness plays a crucial role in accounting for inflation dynamics. The substantial 
decline in the marginal likelihood can be explained by the fact that the slope of the 
Phillips curve turns out to be greater than one when the parameter pα  is set to be 1/3.14 
When compared with the estimate (about 0.037) of the slope, in line with the findings of 
Gali and Gertler (1999), lowering the degree of price stickiness causes the slope of the 
Phillips curve to be unrealistic, creating a situation in which the model fails to fit the data. 
As a consequence, the marginal likelihood drops considerably from -466.7 to -585.7 in 
the 5th column when compared with the benchmark model. In this case, the estimates of 
both πδ  and the standard deviation of the cost-push shock turn out to be much higher 
than the ones from the benchmark model. 
Turning to the 6th two column, the absence of the quadratic costs of wage 
adjustment (that is, 0=c ) gives rise to a significant fall in the marginal likelihood. 
While the Calvo-cum-wage-indexation model developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (2005) does not significantly improve the fit of the baseline model (e.g., Rabanal 
and Rubio-Ramirez 2005), the dual wage stickiness model is able to provide a better fit to 
                                                 
14 Note that the slope of the new Keynesian Phillips curve, ppp ααβα /)1)(1( −− , increases as the degree 
of price stickiness ( pα ) decreases. 
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the data. Smets and Wouters (2007) evaluate a partial indexation model as a variant of the 
Calvo-cum-wage-indexation model in terms of the marginal likelihood, and find that 
assuming partial indexation of wages to past inflation does not lead to a significant 
improvement of the marginal likelihood. The estimate of the Calvo wage stickiness 
parameter ( wα ) indicates that the average frequency of wage changes is 11 quarters. This 
estimate seems to be unrealistic when compared to what is found in the literature.15 When 
the quadratic costs in wage setting are ignored, its contribution to the degree of wage 
stickiness may be absorbed by the Calvo-type wage stickiness. Overall, the findings favor 
the dual wage stickiness model over the baseline model based only on Calvo-type wage 
stickiness. 
Next, in order to investigate the need of dual wage stickiness to the model 
dynamics, the Calvo wage stickiness parameter is reduced to 1/3, assuming that wages 
are adjusted every 1.5 quarters, and the parameter c  related to the quadratic costs is 
controlled to be zero. In this way, the empirical relevance of dual wage stickiness is 
explored. The marginal likelihood for this case turns out to be -688.5, which is 
considerably lower than the one computed in the benchmark model. The findings indicate 
that two types of wage stickiness play an important role in fitting the model to the data. 
The contribution of the Calvo-type wage stickiness to the marginal likelihood can be 
measured by the difference between the last two columns. The difference of the marginal 
likelihood is about 100, providing evidence on Calvo-type wage stickiness. 
 
3.5 Impulse Response Analysis 
                                                 
15  For example, Taylor (1999) provides (in)direct survey evidence of the average frequency being 4 
quarters. 
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In this subsection, the impulse responses to the various shocks using the posterior 
mean estimates of the DSGE model are reported in Table 1. Figure 1 exhibits the impulse 
responses of hours worked, real output, the nominal interest rate, price inflation, wage 
inflation and the real wage to each shock. Lines are produced using the proposed model, 
and dashed lines are generated with the quadratic wage adjustment costs controlled to be 
zero.  
                                      Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions 
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The first column of Figure 1 presents the responses of the endogenous variables to 
a one-standard-deviation technology shock. The shock causes hours worked to fall 
immediately, which is in line with Gali's (1999) empirical findings. However, the fall in 
hours worked is in contrast to implications of the standard RBC model, as addressed by 
Gali (1999). Following the technology shock, output starts to increase slowly. The 
gradual increase in real output results in an immediate fall in hours worked because the 
economy is able to produce more output with fewer hours due to an increase in 
productivity. Price inflation declines because the technology shock reduces the marginal 
cost of production. Both an increase in output and a relatively large decrease in inflation 
yield a fall in the short-term interest rate. Technology shocks also lead to a fall in wage 
inflation. This paper finds that the response of wage inflation to technology shocks is 
very weak in the post-1983 period (these results are available upon request). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Liu and Phaneuf (2007) using VARs.16 As shown in the 
figure, real wages increase in response to a technology shock. 
The second column exhibits the effects of a negative one-standard-deviation 
interest rate shock on the variables over time. This contractionary monetary policy shock 
leads to a decline in hours worked and real output. The monetary policy shock causes 
price and wage inflation to decrease as well. While the dual wage stickiness model 
generates a hump-shaped response of wage inflation to the monetary shock, the baseline 
model shows that wage inflation decreases immediately. The same shock gives rise to a 
gradual decrease in real wages, as shown in VAR studies (e.g., Christiano et al 2005). It 
is worth emphasizing that the presence of dual wage stickiness makes the response of real 
                                                 
16 Liu and Phaneuf (2007) argue that the weak response of wage inflation could be a result of a change in 
monetary policy during the Volcker-Greenspan era. 
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wages to a monetary shock less volatile when compared to the baseline sticky wage 
model. The sticky price model with flexible wages fails to generate a gradual adjustment 
of real wages in response to monetary policy shocks. In this respect, models featuring 
both price and wage stickiness might be more appropriate in accounting for a gradual 
response of real wages to monetary policy shocks.17 Indeed, Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez 
(2005) show that models featuring both staggered price and wage contracts dominate 
models based only on staggered price contracts to explain the data.  
The responses of the variables to a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock are 
presented in the third column. While the cost-push shock drives wages and price inflation 
up, the same shock reduces hours worked and real output. The rise in price inflation leads 
to an increase in the interest rate, allowing the Fed to stabilize price inflation. Following a 
cost-push shock, real wages decline due to a weaker response of wage inflation compared 
to price inflation. The fourth column displays the effects of a one-standard-deviation 
wage-push shock. The movement of hours is very similar to output, similar to responses 
to other kinds of shocks, excluding that to a technology shock. The wage-push shock 
works to reduce output and the number of hours worked over time. While the impact of 
cost-push shocks on output almost dies off within about 10 quarters, wage-push shocks 
have a relatively long-lasting effect on output. In response to wage-push shocks, the 
interest rate rises due to the Fed's attempt to stabilize price inflation. The wage-push 
shock drives real wages up as well. The absence of quadratic costs of wage adjustment 
generates very little effect of wage-push shocks on the variables, as shown by the dashed 
lines. Finally, looking at the last column, all variables rise as a result of a one-standard-
                                                 
17 Note that the sticky wage model with flexible prices implies that real wages increase in response to 
contractionary monetary policy shocks. This model does not explain the observed cyclical behavior of real 
wages. 
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deviation demand shock. The rise in output and prices causes the interest rate to increase 
when facing upward pressures in both output and inflation. The interest rate stays above 
the steady state for more than 20 quarters following demand shocks. 
 
3.6 The Dynamic Correlation Between Wage Inflation and Real Output.  
 
 
Taylor (1999) views the ability to generate the reverse dynamic cross-correlation 
between price inflation and output as a yardstick to evaluate the success of monetary 
models. Chauvet and Kim (2010) show that the output gap-based new Keynesian Phillips 
curve with a lagged inflation term is able to replicate the observed “reverse” dynamic 
correlation between the two variables by simulating a small scale DSGE model.18 Their 
results indicate that the presence of the lagged inflation term plays a crucial role in 
explaining the fact that a rise in output signals a subsequent increase in future price 
inflation, and that an increase in past price inflation leads to a fall in current output. These 
properties of the data are in stark contrast to the implication of the purely new Keynesian 
Phillips curve, supporting the hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve. Turning to the 
dynamics of wage inflation, it might be interesting to examine if the dual wage stickiness 
model is able to replicate the observed reverse dynamic cross-correlation between wage 
inflation and output. 
For this purpose, Figure 2 compares the observed dynamic cross-correlation with 
the model-implied dynamic cross-correlation between output and wage inflation. In 
Figure 2, the data show that past wage inflation is negatively correlated to current output, 
and that current output is positively related to future wage inflation. As the figure shows, 
                                                 
18 Chauvet and Kim (2009) employ the sticky price model with flexible wages. In addition to the new 
Keynesian Phillips curve with a lagged inflation term, they adopt the same IS curve and the Taylor rule as 
the ones employed in this paper. 
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the model is able to deliver a reasonable description of the observed dynamic cross-
correlation between the two variables. In particular, the delayed, gradual impact of output 
on wage inflation is generated due to the presence of the lagged wage inflation term in 
the wage Phillips curve. The lagged wage inflation term generated by dual wage 
stickiness forces wage inflation to adjust slowly in response to changes in output. Note 
 
Figure 2: The Dynamic Correlation Between Output and Wage Inflation 
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that the newly re-optimized wages are only partially adjusted in response to changes in 
economic conditions due to the convex costs of wage adjustment. As a result, a rise in 
output leads to a subsequent increase in wage inflation. As the figure shows, the absence 
of the quadratic wage adjustment costs causes the model to fail to explain the fact that 
output affects wage inflation with lags. When the quadratic wage adjustment costs do not 
exist, households are able to adjust their wages optimally without any restrictions in 
response to changes in output. As a result, the correlation between wage inflation and 
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output could be high, as shown in Figure 3. However, the data show that the correlation 
coefficient is very low. While the data shows that output leads to wage inflation, the 
baseline model allows wage inflation to lead to output. In this respect, the dual wage 
stickiness model is favored over the baseline wage stickiness model.  
 
3.7 The Observed and Theoretical Persistence of the Model Variables 
 
 
To investigate whether the DSGE model is able to match the observed persistence 
in output, in price and wage inflation, in hours worked, and in real wages, Figure 3 
compares the autocorrelation functions of the variables of interest observed from the data 
and generated from the model. In Figure 3, the model-implied autocorrelation functions 
(triangles) are generated using the posterior mean estimates of the model parameters 
reported in Table 1. Dashed blue lines display the 95% confidence intervals of the 
observed persistence (presented as circles) of the data. 
                                  Figure 3:  Autocorrelation Functions of Variables 
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The autocorrelation function of output does well in accounting for the observed 
persistence, but there is still room for improvement in fitting the observed 
autocorrelations of output. The DSGE model under-predicts the observed persistence of 
output. In contrast to output, the model-implied persistence of hours worked over-
predicts the observed persistence of hours. For price inflation, it is generally accepted that 
the introduction of lagged inflation to the Phillips curve significantly improves the fit of 
inflation persistence (e.g., Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez 2005). However, the 
autocorrelation function of price inflation still does not closely match the observed 
persistence. It could be the case, as discussed in the recent literature, that there might be 
additional sources of inflation persistence, such as learning or more lags of price inflation 
(e.g., Milani 2005, Roberts 2005). In terms of wage inflation, the model-implied 
autocorrelation function of wage inflation is able to explain the observed persistence 
reasonably well. Interestingly, although wage inflation is less persistent when compared 
to other variables, the observed autocorrelation function is relatively high for many 
periods. For the real wage, the new Keynesian model with both staggered price and wage 
contracts closely replicates the observed persistence in real wages. Finally, the model is 
able to fit the observed persistence of the nominal interest rate. Overall, the model 
provides a good description of the observed persistence in key macroeconomic variables. 
 
3.8 Sub-samples Analysis 
 
 
To check the stability of the structural parameters, this section compares the 
estimates obtained using subsamples split around 1980. The first subsample runs from 
1960:1 to 1979:4, the period known as the Great Inflation. The second sub-sample ranges 
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from 1983:1 to 2007:4, which corresponds to the Great Moderation, a period in which 
there was a substantial decrease in the observed volatility of output and inflation. Table 3 
presents the posterior distributions of the parameters across periods. In estimating the 
model, the present paper assumes that households adjust their wages every 4 quarters on 
average. 
                               Table 3: Subsample Estimation Results 
Pre-1979 estimate Post-1983 estimate 
Parameters Posterior 95%  of Posterior 95%  of 
mean confidence interval mean confidence interval 
pα  0.80 [ 0.76 , 0.83 ] 0.83 [ 0.79 , 0.86 ] 
β  0.99 [ 0.97 , 1.00 ] 0.99 [ 0.97 , 1.00 ] 
σ  0.13 [ 0.08 , 0.17 ] 0.09 [ 0.06 , 0.11 ] 
c  74.9 [ 50.6 , 99.4 ] 83.6 [ 55.4,  109.9 ] 
ϕ  0.64 [ 0.56 , 0.72 ] 0.61 [ 0.55,  0.66 ] 
γ  0.37 [ 0.26 , 0.47 ] 0.33 [ 0.24 , 0.43 ] 
ρ  0.72 [ 0.67,  0.78 ] 0.84 [ 0.81 , 0.86 ] 
πα  1.34 [ 1.22 , 1.47 ] 2.07 [ 1.90 , 2.23 ] 
yα  0.56 [ 0.41 , 0.69 ] 0.46 [ 0.32 , 0.60 ] 
πδ  0.08 [ 0.01 , 0.16 ] 0.05 [ 0.01 , 0.10 ] 
yδ  0.88 [ 0.82 , 0.94 ] 0.94 [ 0.90 , 0.98 ] 
αδ  0.87 [ 0.80 , 0.94 ] 0.91 [ 0.87 , 0.96 ] 
πσ  0.26 [ 0.21 , 0.31 ] 0.19 [ 0.16 , 0.22] 
yσ  0.04 [ 0.03 , 0.06 ] 0.02 [ 0.02 , 0.03 ] 
iσ  0.21 [ 0.19 , 0.24 ] 0.15 [ 0.13 , 0.17 ] 
wσ  0.34 [ 0.29 , 0.39 ] 0.51 [ 0.45 , 0.58 ] 
ασ  0.67 [ 0.59 , 0.76 ] 0.47 
Note: This table shows Bayesian estimation results for DSGE model. The number of draws is 50,000. I 
keep 25,000 draws. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to obtain the posterior distribution is used. 
[ 0.41 , 0.52 ] 
 
The degree of price stickiness is estimated to be stable across subsamples. 
Regarding wage rigidities, although the average duration of one year is assumed, wage 
stickiness associated with the quadratic costs is robustly found across subsamples. 
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Interestingly, the posterior mean of c  has increased in the second period. This finding 
implies that the wage adjustment costs could be relatively lower for the high inflation 
period. However, considering the 95% confidence intervals of c , the difference is not 
significantly different. Overall, the dual wage stickiness model is once again supported 
by the data. 
The findings indicate that there have been substantial changes in monetary policy 
and the volatility of the various shocks. The estimates of ρ  describing the degree of 
interest rate smoothing are significantly different across periods (and that the 95% 
confidence intervals across periods do not overlap). The estimate of πα  measuring the 
Fed's response to inflation for the pre-1979 period is greater than the one for the post-
1983 period. The Federal Reserve seems to have reacted more aggressively to changes in 
inflation in the second period. These results are consistent with the findings of Clarida et 
al (2000), and are in contrast to the findings of Kim and Nelson (2006) and Smets and 
Wouters (2007), which suggest only a moderate change in monetary policy. Differences 
between these two periods are also found in the standard errors of the demand, interest 
rate, technology shock, and cost-push shock. The decrease in the volatility of these 
shocks indicates that they could have been a potential source of the Great Moderation. In 
contrast, the estimated standard error of the wage-push shock increases in the post-1983 
period. Although the details are not reported in this paper, the volatility of the wage-push 
shock has been increasing since around 2000. 
 
3.9 Counterfactual Analysis 
 
While Clarida et al (2000) point to a shift in monetary policy as a source of the 
reduction in volatility of macroeconomic variables in the post-1983 period, Stock and 
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Watson (2003), Smets and Wouters (2007), and others provide evidence that the decline 
of the shocks plays a major role in lowering the volatility of key macroeconomic 
variables. In response to this debate, it will be useful to examine the potential source of 
the Great Moderation using a counterfactual exercise with the model estimates reported 
in Table 3. 
This counterfactual exercise examines whether the estimated monetary policy rule 
of the 1960s and 1970s could have induced an increase in the volatility of output and 
price inflation in the period of the Great Moderation, that is, assuming that the loose 
monetary policy was still in effect in the second period. The counterfactual exercise also 
replaces the estimated standard deviations of the second subsample with those of the first 
subsample to examine how it affects the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in the 
post-1983 period. 
                                            Table 4: Counterfactual Analysis 
Counterfactual Analysis: 1983:1-2007:4  
Data Policy Shocks Structure Policy & Shocks 
Output 1.24 0.84 1.35 1.00 1.31 
Price Inflation 2.76 1.59 1.40 0.89 
Note: This table shows counterfactual analysis using the DSGE model estimates in Table 3. The 
first column shows the ratio of the standard deviation of each variable in the first sample period to 
the one obtained in the second period. The remaining columns display the ratio of the standard 
deviation of each variable generated from the counterfactual experiment to the model-implied 
standard deviation in the second sample period. 
2.50 
 
The first column of Table 4 displays the ratio of the standard deviation of each 
variable in the pre-1980 period to the one in the post-1983 period. The ratios indicate that 
the standard deviations of output and inflation in the first sample period are 1.24 and 2.76 
times greater than the ones obtained using the second sample period. The remaining 
 30
columns show the ratios of counterfactual standard deviations of the model to implied 
standard deviations of the variables in the second subsample. 
The second column of Table 4 shows that replacing the estimated Taylor rule of 
the second sample period with the one obtained in the first subsample can lead to a rise in 
the volatility of price inflation in the second period, but not in volatility of output. The 
increased volatility of price inflation by 59% arises from the weaker response of the Fed 
to inflation in the first sample period. In contrast to price inflation, the volatility of output 
even declines in this exercise because the estimated Taylor rule implies a relatively 
stronger response to the economic activity in the first sample period. These results are 
broadly consistent with Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). 
In this respect, a shift in monetary policy is not likely to be a source of lower volatility of 
output, although it contributes to the reduction of price inflation volatility. 
On the other hand, when the estimated standard deviations of the shocks in the 
second sample period are replaced with the ones from the first period, the variability of 
the two variables increase by 35% and 40%, respectively, in the second sample period. 
Although the ratio for output is somewhat larger than the data, the results point to the 
shocks as a main source of the Great Moderation with respect to output. This paper 
confirms the findings of Stock and Wotson (2003), Smets and Wouters (2007) and 
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). 
These findings indicate that a shift in monetary policy is the most important 
source of the lower inflation volatility. However, the ratio for price inflation produced 
using the counterfactual exercise regarding monetary policy is still much smaller than the 
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one computed using the data. Hence, a change in monetary policy is not enough to 
account for the observed ratio of price inflation. 
The fourth column reports the results when the first sample estimates of all 
structural coefficients except for both the Taylor rule coefficients and the standard 
deviations of the shocks are used in the counterfactual analysis. A change in economic 
structure fails to explain considerable changes in volatility of output and price inflation. 
Finally, when both the estimated tight monetary policy and lower volatility of the 
shocks in the post-1983 period are replaced with the ones from the first period, the 
predicted ratios get quite close to the values computed using the data, which measure the 
relative volatility between the two periods. This experiment suggests that the economy 
could have experienced volatility of price inflation in the second period as high as that 
experienced in the first period if there had not been changes in both monetary policy and 
the volatility in the shocks across subsamples. For output volatility, it is worth noting that 
while the estimated Taylor rule in the first sample period can reduce output variability, a 
higher volatility of the shocks induces a higher variability of the variable. This 
experiment implies that a combination of tight monetary policy and reduced shocks better 
explains the decline in output volatility of the second sample period. 
 
     4 Conclusion 
 
 
This paper develops a model of wage inflation dynamics that is able to provide 
not only a better description of wage dynamics for policy analysis, but also to replicate 
the reverse dynamic correlation between wage inflation and output. In particular, this 
paper proposes a novel framework that successfully combines two types of wage 
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stickiness. The dual wage stickiness model is favored by U.S. data in terms of marginal 
likelihood as well as the ability to explain the dynamic correlation between wage 
inflation and output. Furthermore, estimation results are robust across periods and DSGE 
model specifications as shown in Table 2 and 3. These results imply that although wage 
contracts are renewed at discrete time intervals, wage setters cannot fully adjust their 
wages, therefore supporting the presence of dual wage stickiness. The findings also 
indicate substantial changes in the standard errors of the shocks and monetary policy. 
Based on these findings and counterfactual analysis, the reduction in volatility of the 
shocks is the most important driver of the decline of output variation. For price inflation, 
a shift in monetary policy plays a relatively more important role in reducing inflation 
volatility. However, changes in both monetary policy and shocks are necessary to account 
reasonably well for lower variations of price inflation. 
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